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marriage when put in issue by the defendant, although it did not
permit its formal dissolution by annulment.30

INJUNCTION-MIGRATORY DIVORCE-RIGHT OF DOMICILIARY TO
ENJOIN PROSECUTION OF Ex PARTE FOREIGN DIVORCE ACTION.-

In an action by a wife for separation and alimony the complaint
alleged that defendant, desiring a divorce, had abandoned plaintiff.
The answer admitted the abandonment, claimed it was justified, but
consented to a separation with alimony to be fixed by the court.
After issue joined plaintiff moved to enjoin defendant from proceeding with a Virgin Islands divorce action alleging that his residence
there was sham and only for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.
Held, temporary injunction during the pendency of the action granted.
When a wife sues for separation and the husband goes to another
jurisdiction and attempts to get a divorce there without appearance
by the wife there is necessity for intervention by a court of equity
for the protection of the wife. The bases for plaintiff's fears are the.
"full faith and credit" and "prima facie weight" holdings of William
v. North Carolina.' Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N. Y. 96 (1951).
The discretionary issuance by equity of injunctions is commonly
asserted to rest upon the irreparable injury which would result to
the petitioning party were the restraining order not granted.2 Irreparable injury is said to exist when some legal wrong has been
done or threatened and when there exists in the moving party some
substantial legal right to be protected.3
The law is well established that a court of equity has the inherent power to enjoin and restrain residents of its jurisdiction4
from prosecuting an action commenced in a foreign jurisdiction.
However, in Goldstein v. Goldsteinr5 it was held by the Court of
Appeals that a permanent injunction would not issue at the instance
of the petitioning domiciliary on the grounds (1) that a foreign
divorce decree issued by a court not having jurisdiction of the matrimonial domicile, being void, injures no one, 6 and (2) that an injury
30 Villafana v. Villafana, 275 App. Div. 810, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 389 (1st Dep't

1949).

1317 U. S. 287 (1942); 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
WALSH, A TREATISE ON Egurry § 57 (1930).

2

3
Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929); Gold v.
Gold, 158 Misc. 570, 287 N. Y. Supp. 217 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
4 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890).
See Pound, The Progress
of the Law--Equity, 33 HARv: L. REv. 420, 425 (1920).
5 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. 2d 969 (1940). For a criticism of the Goldstein
case, see Comment, 9 FoRD. L. REv. 376 (1940).

6 "The plaintiff has nothing to fear from the action .

.

. against her in

Florida for . . . a judgment entered therein would be a nullity."
v. Goldstein, mpra note 5 at 148. 27 N. E. 2d at 969.
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of feelings 7 does not warrant the intervention of the equity powers
of a court.
Subsequent to the above decision the Appellate Division, First
8
Department, in Pereirav. Pereira,
at the instance of a wife who had
previously obtained a judgment of separate maintenance, granted a
temporary injunction enjoining the husband from proceeding in a
foreign divorce action. The court distinguished the Goldstein case
on the grounds that: (1) at the time the latter case was decided
matrimonial domicile was the basis upon which the issuance of a
divorce decree was predicated, 9 (2) subsequent to the Goldstein case
mere domicile' 0 of either spouse, guilty or not," was a sufficient
jurisdictional basis for the issuance of a decree, and (3) because of
this change in the law the burden of overcoming the prima facie
validity accorded to a foreign decree of divorce was placed upon the
nonmigratory spouse. Apparently the court felt this burden of proof
constituted the irreparable injury necessary to warrant the issuance
of an injunction.
The instant case upholds the reasoning of Pereirav. Pereira and
other lower court holdings 12 to the effect that since the jurisdictional
principle upon which Goldstein v. Goldstein relied is no longer law,
the latter case cannot be considered a controlling authority.'3 It
is interesting to note, however, that although the present case involved the granting of an injunction to prevent the impairment of
plaintiff's rights in the separation action,1 4 the rationale of the case
is broad enough to cover all situations where the migratory husband
attempts to procure a "fraudulent" divorce.'3 This conclusion is
7 Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929); cf. Gold
v. Gold, 158 Misc. 570, 287 N. Y. Supp. 217 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
8272 App. Div. 281, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 763 (1st Dep't 1947).

9Haddock

v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).

10 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
1 Ibid.
12 Palmer v. Palmer, 268 App. Div. 1010, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 383 (3d Dep't
1944); Ciacco v. Ciacco, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Ashkenaz v.
Ashkenaz, 180 Misc. 580, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1943). See Note,
13 BROOXLYN L. REv. 148 (1947) for a comprehensive discussion of the lower
court holdings since the Goldstein case.
"3"Back in the days when Haddock v. Haddock . . . made void foreign
judgments of the kind being attempted here, our court held . . . that such
injunctive relief was unnecessary for . . . the spouse who . . could not be
bound thereby anyhow . . . ." Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N. Y. 96, 101 (1951).
14 Plaintiff-wife sought the injunction as an incident to her separation
action. The court held applicable to the action Section 878(1) of the New
York Civil Practice Act which authorizes an injunction where the defendant,
during the pendency of the action, is about to do an act in violation of plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. Id. at 103.
15 One of the questions certified which the court answered in the affirmative
was: "2. Was it proper for the Supreme Court to grant the restraining order
as an aid to the prosecution of this action, or the protectiont of her marital
status .
?" (Italics added.) The court also stated: "If the husband be
allowed to prosecute his foreign suit to judgment, the wife, to save her rights
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buttressed by the fact that the court cited with approval the Pereira
case wherein the wife was granted an injunction enjoining a foreign
divorce action even though she had previously obtained a judgment
of separate maintenance. The Pereira case, in distinguishing Estin
v. Estin' 6(wherein it was held that rights obtained under a judgment of separation were not affected by a subsequent valid ex parte
divorce), observed that it was not so much concerned with protecting
private rights established under the separation judgment as it was
17
with protecting those rights flowing from the marital status itself.
On this basis it would appear that a domiciliary spouse may maintain
an independent action for an injunction against the prosecution of
a foreign divorce action merely upon a showing that the migratory
spouse is a domiciliary of the forum.' 8
The court in the Pereira case also expressed the hope that the
finding on domicile by the forum would have some influence on the
foreign court if the husband, in disobedience to the injunction, proceeded in his action. It is doubtful whether the foreign court will
give much, if any, weight to this jurisdictional finding even if it
had been contested by the husband in the injunction forum.,, The
injunction, however, is not without a deterrent effect. The husband
may be punished for contempt when he returns to the injunction
forum 20 and, more important, may be estopped
from setting up the
21
decree in any subsequent action by the wife.
as wife, will have to bring a new suit to set aside the foreign decree and in
that suit will have to bear the heavy burden of striking down the prima facie
effect of the foreign court's finding of residence." Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N. Y.
96, 102 (1951). This reason is broad enough to cover the case where the wife
brings an independent action for an injunction.
16296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E. 2d 113 (1947), off'd, 334 U. S. 541 (1948).
1 Pereira v. Pereira, 272 App. Div. 281, 289, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 763, 769
(1947).
18 A mere threat to institute foreign divorce proceedings is not a sufficient
basis for the issuance of an injunction. De Raay v. De Raay, 255 App. Div.
544, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 361 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 280 N. Y. 822, 21 N. E. 2d
879 (1939). Contra: Kahn v. Kahn, 325 Ill. App. 137, 59 N. E. 2d 874 (1945).
19 "Where the equity defendant appears in the foreign divorce court ...
assuming the court learns of the injunction, what effect should be given thereto?
Nevada could then make a further finding of domicil (it being a jurisdictional
fact) and determine for itself that the divorce plaintiff was there domiciled.

This would not necessarily go counter to the determination of the enjoining
state; recognition could be given to the finding of domicil there up to the time
of the injunction, after which there had been a change." Jacobs, The Utility
of Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Migratory Divorce, 2 LAW AND
CoNTEmP. PRoB. 370, 389 (1935).
Cf. Palmer v. Palmer, 184 Misc. 291, 53
N. Y. S. 2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (the Nevada court granted a decree of
divorce although it had been served with a certified copy of the injunction).
20 ".
. the Nevada finding might well not find favor with the courts of
New York ...
. The courts of the enjoining state would undoubtedly punish
for contempt upon a return thereto." Jacobs, supra note 19, at 389.
21 Cf. Palmer v. Palmer, 184 Misc. 291, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 784 (Sup. Ct.
1945). Here the plaintiff-wife as an incident to a separation action obtained
an injunction enjoining the prosecution of a foreign divorce action. The court
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Interstate injunctions do not, in theory, clash with the right that
a husband has to seek in good faith a new domicile, and there obtain
the relief afforded by its courts, since such injunctions are premised
upon a finding that the husband is, in fact, a domiciliary of the
forum. It follows therefore, on principle, that it is immaterial whether
the injunction is in form temporary or permanent-in either event
it will lose all22 efficacy if the husband thereafter obtains a new bona
fide domicile.
Although an ex parte foreign divorce decree based on a sham
domicile is as invalid today as it was before the Williams case 23 the
court, in the instant case, held that the prima facie validity which
must now be accorded such decrees constituted a sufficient basis for
the issuance of an injunction. No doubt the court was not unaware
of the fact that even the so-called void decree before the Williams
case was not wholly without an injurious effect upon the nonmigratory spouse. 24 Whether or not the issuance of interstate injunctions may lead to socially desirable results,2 5 it seems clear that
the injunctive process will now receive greater use as a means of deterring those spouses whose only intent is to obtain foreign divorce
decrees based on a sham domicile.

X
INJUNCTION-UNFAIR COMPETITION-INTERVENTION TO PROTECT MODERN BUSINESS INTERESTS.-The Metropolitan Opera Association sought to enjoin defendant's unauthorized manufacture and
sale of "off the air" recordings of the Metropolitan's opera performances. An intervening plaintiff recording company had, by
refused to allow the husband to set up in a supplemental answer a Nevada
decree
procured in disregard of the injunction.
22
See Note 13 BRooicYN L. REv. 148, 161, n. 66 (1946) ; 28 ILL. L. REv.
295, 296 (19335.

23 Before the Williants case a spouse seeking to impeach a foreign decree
had to show that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over the matrimonial
domicile; today it must be proved that the migratory spouse was not domiciled in the foreign jurisdiction. The distinction is in the quantity and quality
of proof required to upset the foreign decree.
24 A direct financial injury might possibly result to the wife even under
the void decree. The husband might marry again. If the second "wife" sued
for separate maintenance the husband would be estopped from setting up the
void decree under the rule of Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. 2d
290 (1940). The husband would then be under a duty to support two wives
thus affecting the amount of supprt the first wife would obtain. For a discussion of other injuries, not financial, which a wife may sustain as a result
of a void decree, see Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App. Div. 104, 218 N. Y.
Supp. 87 (1st Dep't 1926); Comment, 9 FoRD. L. REv. 376 (1940).
25 "In all the cases where an injunction has issued against foreign divorce,
there has been an actual family break-up. . . . If anything, it [the injunction]
is likely still further to widen the breach." Jacobs, mipra note 19, at 390.

